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Abstract High-profile failures in financial trading have led
to interest in how the culture of the industry produces risky
and unethical behaviours among traders. Yet, there is no
established theoretical framework for studying this: we
apply safety culture theory to examine ten recent high-
profile trading mishaps investigated by the UK financial
regulator. The results show that the dimensions of safety
culture (e.g. Management Commitment to Safety, Systems
and procedures) used to understand organisational acci-
dents in domains such as aviation also explain failures in
Risk Management within financial trading organisations.
This counters narratives focusing on traders who are
unethical ‘rule breakers’, and emphasises the value of a
systemic approach, whereby safety culture theory is used to
explain why risky behaviours in financial trading occur.
Safety culture therefore provides a conceptual basis for
further research on risky and unethical behaviours in
financial trading, alongside providing insights for possible
intervention.
Keywords Safety culture  Failure  Risk-taking 
Financial trading  Regulation  Culture measurement
Introduction
A series of large-scale failures to manage risk in the
financial trading sector have led to multi-million dollar
losses and fines (e.g. at Societe General, UBS, JPMorgan)
and a focus on organisational culture within companies
operating in the industry (Ashby et al. 2012; Palermo et al.
2016). This interest has arisen due to the role of unethical
and risky behaviours (e.g. rogue trading, mis-selling, sys-
temic rate rigging) in causing such failures (Greener 2006),
with these practices being viewed as reflective of the
‘values and the situational experience of a multitude of
organisational agents’ (Power 2009, p. 854).
Thus, culture change has been identified as a way to
restore trust in financial institutions, improve Risk Man-
agement and avoid future failures (Parliamentary Com-
mission on Banking Standards 2013). Yet, to achieve this,
it is necessary to provide a clear conceptualisation of how
the cultures of financial trading organisations produce risky
and unethical behaviours and what a desirable culture
might be. Various ‘dimensions’ of culture have been sug-
gested (e.g. leadership, governance, competency, controls,
rewards, risk appetite), yet descriptions remain atomistic
and poorly defined (Power et al. 2013; Ring et al. 2016).
This means there is little standardisation for how organi-
sational culture is conceptualised in financial trading and,
as a consequence, an incomplete and disjointed under-
standing of the factors that underlie risky and unethical
behaviours.
To address this issue, the current article applies ‘safety
culture’ theory to conceptualise and explain failures to
manage risk within financial trading. Safety culture refers
to beliefs (e.g. management priorities) and practices (e.g.
risk-taking, protocols) for managing safety in high-risk
organisations (e.g. aviation, health care, nuclear power,
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military) (Cooper 2000; Guldenmund 2000; Mearns et al.
2001; Pidgeon 1998; Reiman and Oedewald 2004).
Although different approaches exist to theorise and mea-
sure organisational culture (Cameron and Quinn 2005;
Erez and Gati 2004; Hofstede et al. 1990), safety culture
has become the dominant theory used to understand how
cultural factors determine risk practices in industries that
must balance competing demands of productivity and
safety (Glendon and Stanton 2000; Nordlo¨f et al. 2015).
This is because safety culture explains how social envi-
ronments directly influence risk practices and because
problems in safety culture often underlie mishaps within
other high-risk domains (e.g. aviation, health care, energy).
Although financial trading is not a safety critical industry,
mishaps are highly damaging for organisations and
economies, and their causes are similar to those in other
high-risk industries (e.g. managerial pressure to increase
profit, ineffective procedures).
Thus, in this article, we examine whether safety culture
theory also provides a useful conceptual framework for
explaining and theorising failures to manage risk in
financial trading. We do this through analysing ten high-
profile investigations (conducted by the UK Financial
Conduct Authority) of Risk Management within financial
trading organisations. The purpose is to establish whether
safety culture theory can provide a coherent account of
why large-scale failures in financial trading organisations
occur, and through drawing on this literature, to outline
potential future steps for research and intervention.
Financial Trading and Safety Culture
Financial trading organisations buy and sell products (e.g.
equities, physical commodities) in order to hedge existing
risk, capitalise on arbitrage opportunities, speculate on
market volatility and enhance their portfolios (e.g. risk
position and profit). Financial trading is increasingly con-
ceptualised as similar to a high-risk industry (Sutcliffe
2011; Young 2011), with risk constantly being monitored
and when possible hedged. However, an important dis-
tinction is that, unlike many high-risk industries, the suc-
cess of financial trading hinges on overt risk-taking by
traders (as it leads to competitive advantage and potential
profit). This feature is consistent with Amalberti’s (2013)
description of an ‘ultra-resilient’ organisation, where,
rather than engineer risk out of the system, risk is managed
through improving employee skills and system design
(Amalberti 2013).
Yet, whilst some risk-taking is essential for success in
financial trading organisations, unimpeded risk-taking can
be highly destructive. Investigations into large-scale fail-
ures within financial trading organisations have highlighted
problems with ‘rogue traders’ who manipulate rules and
Systems in order to gain short-term advantage (but with
long-term costs). Although popular narratives have focused
on the characteristics and unethical activities of ‘rogue
traders’ as underlying financial scandals (Gapper 2011),
academic research increasingly focuses on the organisa-
tional cultures that cultivate and allow risky and unethical
trader activities (Gilligan 2011; Jennings 2008).
This is because such behaviours are a product of the
practices that are encouraged, rewarded and penalised by
trading firms (Chen et al. 1997; Kaptein 2011; Saini and
Martin 2009). For example, research in finance has focused
on the importance of ‘fit’ between the values of employees
and their organisations for shaping ethical practices (Van
Hoorn 2015), on tendencies for dishonesty with banking
(Cohn et al. 2014), stigmatisation of industry practices
(Roulet 2014) and the need for professionals and regulators
to monitor and improve the culture of financial organisa-
tions (IIF 2009; Sants 2010; Wheatley 2012).
Yet, further description and theoretical analyses are
required of what an ‘appropriate’ culture in financial
trading is comprised of (Mcconnell and Blacker 2013; Ring
et al. 2016). In particular, it is necessary to develop a
cultural framework that is ‘reduced and simplified to some
observable properties that can be acted upon and audited by
others’ (Ashby et al. 2012, p. 18), for example in terms of
rigorously determined conceptual underpinnings, distinct
cultural dimensions and associations between these and
risky behaviours by traders. To achieve this, scholars have
drawn parallels between financial trading and other
industries where risk-taking is sometimes necessary, but
hugely damaging if not managed effectively: for example,
aviation, nuclear power or health care (Young 2011).
Within such industries, the concept of ‘safety culture’ is
widely used to describe, explain and assess risk-related
activities (Noort et al. 2015; Singer et al. 2009), and there
may be value in applying this theoretical framework to
financial trading. We explore this below.
Safety Culture
Safety culture is a safety-related facet of organisational
culture and refers to the beliefs (e.g. on the priorities of
management) and practices (e.g. risk-taking, protocols)
within organisations that influence how risk and safety are
managed (Cooper 2000; Guldenmund 2000; Mearns et al.
2001; Pidgeon 1998; Reiman and Oedewald 2004). The
concept of safety culture became prominent due to it being
identified as a casual factor in various catastrophic acci-
dents (e.g. Chernobyl, NASA Challenger, Piper Alpha). In
these cases, poor risk practices at an operational level (e.g.
ignoring protocols, disregarding risk) were shown to be
influenced by cultural norms that were determined by
organisational and industry characteristics (e.g. rewards
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123
Systems, management priorities, regulation) (Pate´-Cornell
1993; Pidgeon 1991; Zohar 1980). This was a significant
observation, because it moved academic and practical
theorisations on why organisational accidents occur away
from a focus on individual employees (e.g. ‘error’, ‘in-
competence’ or ‘disregard for safety’) and instead to the
Systems and environments in which they operate (Reason
1998).
Over a period of 30 years, safety culture has become the
dominant theoretical lens through which to understand how
organisational culture shapes risk practices (Antonsen
2012; Strauch 2015; Zohar 2010). Although many theories
and measurements exist for studying organisational culture
and behaviour (Ashkanasy et al. 2000), safety culture
focuses upon explaining why organisational employees
engage in risky and unethical behaviours, and how these
can lead to mishaps. Thus, for industries in which Risk
Management is central to delivery, and where failures to
effectively manage risk can lead to catastrophic failure,
safety culture is valuable both theoretically and practically.
Theoretically, it is useful in terms of helping organisations
to understand how their social environments determine and
shape the ethical and risk-related behaviours of employees.
Practically, through safety culture measurement, it allows
organisations to monitor their culture and to identify
whether the organisational conditions that influence mis-
haps are positive or changing.
The validity of this approach is demonstrated by
research showing safety culture to be associated with safety
outcomes and risky activities (Clarke 2006; Hajmohammad
and Vachon 2014). Indeed, safety culture measurement and
improvement has become an integral part of Risk Man-
agement within domains such as health care, aviation,
offshore oil and gas production, and nuclear power (Carroll
1998; Mearns et al. 2001; Reader et al. 2015; Weaver et al.
2013). Yet, no comparable approach exists for financial
trading, and in the context of financial organisations being
required to monitor and improve Risk Management and
organisational culture (IIF 2009; Parliamentary Commis-
sion on Banking Standards 2013), safety culture theory
appears useful for the following three reasons.
First, the approach of safety culture theory—to con-
ceptualise risk-related behaviours by organisational
employees as a product of the norms and values within a
given system—may be insightful for understanding poor
practices within financial trading. Rather than focusing on
the behaviour of individual ‘bad apples’, safety culture
theory focuses on how failures to manage risk reflect the
normative tendencies and perceived priorities of an
organisation (e.g. on pressures related to production versus
safety) (Guldenmund 2000), and are representative of the
robustness of Systems and procedures for managing risk
(e.g. just culture) (Dekker 2012). In particular, safety
culture appears relevant to financial trading because similar
factors as those found to underlie mishaps in safety critical
domains (e.g. reward structures, poorly designed Systems,
skill deficits, unclear boundaries of acceptable behaviour)
have been identified as important in cases of financial
mismanagement and rogue trading (Land et al. 2014; Sims
and Brinkmann 2003). Yet, in financial trading, no coher-
ent framework exists for describing how organisational
culture influences risky and unethical behaviours (Power
et al. 2013; Ring et al. 2016). Safety culture provides an
initial and well-established foundation for doing this.
Second, scholars have outlined a number of core ‘latent’
dimensions that capture the key characteristics of safety
culture (e.g. Management Commitment to Safety). This is
useful, because it allows for a more nuanced understanding
of how different aspects of safety culture impact upon
workplace activity, why risky and unethical behaviours are
occurring, and what steps could be taken to reduce this. For
example, where organisations have a culture of penalising
those who make mistakes or slow down productivity for
safety reasons, employees are less likely to report safety
problems and near misses (Dekker 2012). It is beyond the
scope of this article to list and review all safety culture
studies; however, to illustrate, Table 1 lists the dimensions
of safety culture used in ten prominent empirical studies
and three literature reviews since 1999.
Although the micro-dimensions used to measure safety
culture vary according to each paper, at a macro-level,
conceptualisations of safety culture have a high degree of
overlap. As summarised in Box 1, over-arching dimensions
used to measure safety culture are Management Commit-
ment to Safety (e.g. perceptions of staff for the managerial
expectations on risk-related behaviours), risk handling (e.g.
responding to error, risk-taking behaviours), Rules and
Regulation (e.g. safety protocols), Systems (e.g. policies,
incident reporting) and collaboration (e.g. communication,
teamwork on safety). These constructs appear especially
relevant to describing the cultural dimensions that account
for risky and unethical behaviours in financial trading. For
example, in the case of the Barclays Plc. rate-rigging
misconduct, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) indi-
cated that Systems and control failings, a conflict between
organisational goals and organisational stability (e.g. to
make profit), and weakly perceived management commit-
ment to effectively manage risk catalysed the trading
misconduct. Thus, the specific psychometric dimensions of
safety culture used to understand problems in Risk Man-
agement within other industries may provide explanatory
insight into the different forms of risky behaviour observed
in financial trading.
Third, within the financial trading industry professionals
and regulators have called for the need to establish
guidelines to monitor and improve the ‘risk culture’ of
Safety Culture in Financial Trading: An Analysis of Trading Misconduct Investigations
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Table 1 Literature review of safety culture dimensions
References Domain Methodology Dimensions Interesting finding
Ha˚vold
(2010)
Fishing vessels Safety culture questionnaire, 50
questions—distributed to experts in EU
Attitudes towards
Rules and
Regulations
Safety training and
drills
Job satisfaction
Fisherman’s safety
attitude
Conflict between
work and safety
Pressure
Management safety
attitude
Safety attitude of management had a
strong influence on a company’s safety
policy—fisherman not involved in
accident showed more positive attitudes
towards safety culture
Jeffcott
et al.
(2006)
Railway Two-year qualitative study, 40 interviews
and 50 focus groups with 500 employees
in 4 organisations
Stakeholder
relationships
Management
commitment
Performance regime
Blame and
culpability
Knowledge
management
Organisational
learning
Resources
Morale
Homogeneity of
culture
How safety culture influences trust within
the organisation—trust is key to safety
performance
TOCs do not approach the classical ‘safe’
organisation model (e.g. they exhibit a
rigid rather than flexible hierarchy and
procedures, deficiencies relating to
perceptions of management
commitment)
Goncalves
Filho et al.
(2010)
Petrochemicals Questionnaire measuring 5 aspects of OSC
in 23 petrochemical companies, adopting
the model of Hudson (2001)
Information
(incident
reporting)
Organisational
learning
Involvement
(participation of
employees)
Commitment
(planning,
priorities)
Communication
No theoretical or empirical research on
safety culture in this industry—this study
shows that the model of Hudson (2001)
and the revised framework can identify
levels of safety culture maturity in this
domain
Olsen
(2010)
Healthcare and
petroleum
sectors
Questionnaires, 1919 (55% return) in
health care and 1806 (52% return) in Oil
and Gas
Organisational
management
support for safety
Transitions and
teamwork across
units
Supervisor/manager
expectations and
actions promoting
safety
Learning, feedback
and improvement
Teamwork within
units
Testing the feasibility of cross-industrial
structural model of identifying general
safety climate concepts
M. P. Leaver, T. W. Reader
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Table 1 continued
References Domain Methodology Dimensions Interesting finding
Lu and
Yang
(2011)
Passenger
Ferry
Survey data from 155 experts in Taiwan Safety policy
Safety motivation
Emergency
preparedness
Safety training
Safety
communication
Study provides empirical evidence of the
importance of safety climate in
explaining worker’s safety behaviours in
passenger ferry operations
Reader and
O’Connor
(2014)
Air traffic
control
Psychometric properties of SC model
(ATM) were examined in 17 countries,
from 4 distinct regions (North, East,
South, West)—expert staff (n = 5176)
and management staff (n = 1230)
Management
Commitment to
Safety
Collaborating for
safety
Incident reporting
Communication
Colleague
commitment
Safety support
Demonstrated for the first time that when
safety culture is tailored to specific
industry, they can operate consistently
across national borders
Lee and
Harrison
(2000)
Nuclear power
stations
120-item questionnaire in three nuclear
power stations. Seven focus groups, each
composed of 10–12 staff and addresses
attitudes and behaviour
Confidence in safety
(e.g. control
measures, safety
standards)
Job satisfaction (e.g.
trust in colleagues)
Participation (e.g.
perceived
empowerment)
Risk (e.g.
organisational
risk-taking, risk
versus
productivity)
Safety rules (e.g.
complexity of
instructions)
Stress (e.g. personal
stress, job
security)
Timing/selection
(e.g. quality of
training)
Personnel safety surveys can usefully be
applied to deliver a multi-perspective,
comprehensive and economical
assessment of the current state of a safety
culture and explored the dynamic of
inter-relationships of its ‘working parts’
Ek et al.
(2003)
Air traffic
control
Observations of daily work, COPSOQ
questionnaire with 95 questions
representing 9 dimensions, standardised
interview with 9 employees at each
control centre
Working situation
Communication
Reporting
Justness
Flexibility
Learning
Safety-related
behaviour
Attitude to safety
Risk perception
Safety culture varies across locations and
personnel levels. All groups felt that they
had not received enough training in how
the communication should function in
emergencies. Managers tend to be very
positive in their reports of safety culture
Safety Culture in Financial Trading: An Analysis of Trading Misconduct Investigations
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Table 1 continued
References Domain Methodology Dimensions Interesting finding
Wiegmann
et al.
(2004)
Theoretical
literature
analysis (all
domains)
Systematic literature review Organisational
commitment
Management
commitment
Employee
empowerment
Rewards system
Reporting systems
This study posits that there is considerable
disagreement among professionals on
how to define safety culture and to
differentiate it from safety climate
Farrington-
Darby
et al.
(2005)
Railway Group and individual semi-structured
interviews were employed. 34
respondents were interviewed in 6
groups (front-line operational staff who
volunteered)
Communication
Rule dissemination
Pre-job information
Supervisor visibility
Equipment
Planners
competency
Perceived purpose
of paper work
Training methods
Front-line actors have a strong underlying
sense that safety is not only their
responsibility—but that they will look
for an ‘easy and comfortable’ way of
achieving task even if this involves
increased risk. Senior management were
seen as having considerable influence on
how easy or difficult it was to be ‘safe’
Cox and
Cheyne
(2000)
Offshore
environments
Focus group discussions (n = 40) using
both offshore and onshore personnel in 3
organisations at 6 locations. N = 375
employees in groups ranging from
between 3 and 12 made up the focus
groups. 83 managers, 181 worked on
onshore, 194 offshore
Management
commitment (e.g.
supervisor
support)
Priority of safety
Communication
(e.g. safety
information)
Safety rules (e.g.
complexity of
procedures)
Supportive
environment
Personal priorities
and need for safety
Personal
appreciation of
risk (e.g. risk-
taking behaviour)
Involvement (e.g.
participation)
Work environment
(e.g. equipment
and design)
Most common dimensions were
management commitment, management
actions and the physical work
environment and safety issues and the
priority given to safety issues. This
helped construct a common taxonomy
for the industry—set of safety climate
assessment tools
Flin et al.
(2000)
Energy sector Review of methods and results from
industrial surveys, thematic basis of 18
scales used to assess safety climate.
Thematic analysis following a literature
search, 18 published reports of safety
climate surveys
Management
Safety system
Risk
Work pressure
Competence
Procedures/rules
Suggests that the most typically assessed
dimensions relate to management (72%),
the safety system (67%), risk (67%), in
addition themes relating to work pressure
and competence appear relevant
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trading organisations (IIF 2009; Sants 2010; Wheatley
2012). This is seen as essential to restoring trust in financial
institutions, improving Risk Management and avoiding
catastrophic failures (House of Commons Treasury Com-
mittee 2009; Parliamentary Commission on Banking
Standards 2013). Yet, there is little consensus within the
literature on what an appropriate culture is or how it should
be monitored and measured (Mcconnell and Blacker 2013;
Ring et al. 2016). Within other high-risk industries, safety
culture measurement is often used to benchmark risk-re-
lated practices within organisations in a given industry
(Mearns et al. 2001). These data (e.g. surveys, incident
reports, qualitative interviews) are used to develop a nor-
mative understanding of the industry, to recognise ‘outlier’
organisations (e.g. ‘high’ or ‘low’ performers) and to
identify opportunities for learning and change within and
between organisations. Thus, the methodology and con-
cepts used in safety culture research provide a potential
way forward for enhancing how risk culture is monitored
and improved in the financial trading industry.
The Current Study
In summary, whilst large-scale failures to manage risk in
financial trading do not necessarily lead to loss of life, they
can seriously undermine economic and social structures.
Safety culture theory may provide a useful framework for
understanding the employee risk practices in financial
trading that underlie these failures, outlining the specific
dimensions of culture that influence behaviour in trading
firms and measuring and benchmarking industry practices
on risk. We examine the potential for this through ana-
lysing ten high-profile organisational failures in the UK
financial trading industry. Specifically, through taking a
safety culture perspective to systematically analyse Final
Notices (FNs)1 issued by the Financial Conduct Authority
(FCA) we:
1. Examine whether safety culture theory can account for
employee risk practices in financial trading mishaps
2. Provide an initial framework of cultural dimensions for
measuring and evaluating safety culture in financial
trading
Table 1 continued
References Domain Methodology Dimensions Interesting finding
Halligan
and
Zecevic
(2011)
Health care Literature review to identify the concepts
of safety culture prevalent in the
healthcare domain—studies published
between 1980 and 2009. 1324 titles were
reviewed, 1124 unique abstracts, 200 full
text papers, 139 papers fully reviewed
Leadership
commitment to
safety
Open
communication
founded on trust
Organisational
learning
A non-punitive
approach to
adverse event
reporting and
analysis
Teamwork
Shared belief in the
importance of
safety
Attempts to determine a common set of
definitions and dimensions that can
enable researchers to better share
information and strategies to improve
methods
Clarke
(1999)
Questionnaire to elicit the perceptions of
312 rail staff using 25 ‘dimensions’ of
railway safety
Management
Commitment to
Safety
Conflict between
work and safety
Rules and processes
Skills and attitudes
of employees
equipment
The study shows that whilst there is a
shared perception of the importance of
safety across the group, inter-group
perceptions are not representative.
Furthermore, inter-group perceptions are
essential to mutual trust and the
foundation of positive safety culture
1 FNs are comprehensive legal documentation available in the public
domain that examine systematic investigations into instances of
trading misconduct and set out action taken against companies or
individuals for breaches of regulatory requirements. They provide an
unbiased forensic analysis of the working context, nature of the
violations and reasons for the breach.
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3. Test the utility of these cultural dimensions through
examining whether and how they influenced risk
practices reported within the Final Notices
Method
The current study adopts safety culture theory to analyse
ten Final Notices. Below we outline a Final Notice, the
procedure for case selection and the analytical procedure
used to analyse the cases.
A Final Notice is issued by the FCA when it has taken
enforcement action against an individual or an organisation
due to their conduct falling below the expected standards
(Financial Services Authority 2012). An FN sets out action
taken against firms or individuals for regulatory breaches
and explains the nature of and reason for the breach. The
penalties and their publication in an FN are specifically
intended to encourage change in the behaviour of the
offender and deter future non-compliance by others. In this
capacity, FNs provide a rich source of data for under-
standing how culture shapes employee risk practices in
financial trading, and are a valuable learning tool for
financial organisations. Although FNs focus on aspects of
an incident such as managerial decision-making, technical
Systems and controls and internal compliance checks, they
have not previously been considered systemically within a
culture framework (Bryce et al. 2013).
Box 1 Recognised components of safety culture
Management Commitment to Safety: Policies with regard to supervision and motivation of the workforce and the adherence to the rules (e.g.
perceptions of staff for the managerial expectations on risk-related behaviours)
Blame and culpability
Employee participation (e.g. perceived empowerment)
Management safety attitude
Supervisor/management expectations
Morale
Safety motivation
Shared belief in the importance of safety
Risk: Policies with regard to which, when and how risks are evaluated (e.g. responding to error, risk-taking behaviours)
Appreciations or risk (e.g. risk-taking behaviour)
Confidence in safety (e.g. control measures, safety standards)
Rules and Regulations: Policies with regard to formal procedures and instructions (balanced by what is trained and how workers are recruited and
selected). Basically, policies determining the structure of work (e.g. safety protocols)
Checklists
Planning
Rule dissemination
Safety rules (e.g. the complexity of instructions)
Safety training and drills
Systems: Policies with regard to how identified risks are avoided, reduced or controlled by design or layout (e.g. policies determining the choice
of barriers that control present dangers and risks) and policies with regard to maintenance and inspection (e.g. policies, incident reporting) and
how often, etc.)
Incident reporting (non-punitive)
Internal audits
Organisation of system access rights (e.g. access to information based on roles)
Resources
Systems alerts and controls
Systems maintenance (e.g. breach reports sent consistently)
Collaboration: Policies with regard to effective collaboration and interaction of (groups) of people (e.g. communication, teamwork on safety)
Ability to speak up within the organisation
Transitions and teamwork across units
Trust in colleagues
Conflict between work and safety (e.g. risk appetite and performance goals)
M. P. Leaver, T. W. Reader
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Case Selection
The selection criteria were that:
1. The Final Notice related to a trading department (e.g.
excluding retail banking, insurance funds, wealth
management).
2. The events took place after the 2008 financial crisis (as
this is when interest in culture and risk practices first
emerged within the industry).
3. The magnitude of the financial penalty ([5 M GBP)
were large enough that the event can be considered a
significant organisational failure.
4. Repeated failures (e.g. LIBOR) were excluded after the
first case in order to avoid skewing the results of the
analysis.
Our final sample represents 0.47% of the total cases
available in the FCA Final Notices database and 21% of the
total cases where the penalty is equal to or greater than 5 M
GBP. In the final sample, six large banking institutions
were represented (Barclays Plc., Credit Suisse, UBS AG,
JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., RBS, Toronto Dominion and
RBS). Three of the institutions were repeatedly selected:
Barclays Plc. (2), JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. (2) and UBS
AG (3). The problems ranged from individual rogue trad-
ing to market collusion and regulatory reporting infrac-
tions. To ensure the generalisability of safety culture as a
theory for understanding trading mishaps, the case selec-
tion ensured that a wide range of offenders and problem
types were analysed. To do this, we only included one
instance of any particular type of event. For example, in the
case of LIBOR rate rigging, five banks were penalised,
only one bank was chosen in the cases, and we chose the
first case detailed by the FCA. This ensured both variety
and randomness in the sample of cases selected.
The selected FNs varied in terms of financial penalty;
the average penalty amount is £74.5M, the lowest financial
fine is £5.6M, and the highest fine is £196.5M. The sum-
mary of reasons for the various infractions also vary from
manipulation of foreign currencies (UBS AG), inappro-
priate submission of regulatory data (Barclays Plc.) and
failure to adequately assess and monitor the risks associ-
ated with trading activities (JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.).
The ten cases are summarised in Table 2.
Procedure
The method used to analyse the ten Final Notices was
qualitative content analysis. This is consistent with
accounting studies that used content analysis to examine
risk disclosures (Linsley et al. 2006; Miihkinen 2012). The
content analysis carried out in this paper follows the
method presented by Kowal and O’Connell (2014) and is a
more exploratory process than previous studies (Ring et al.
2016; Turner 1994).
Each FN case was loaded into NVivo11 and then anal-
ysed by two organisational psychologists: one with
expertise in Risk Management in financial trading and the
Table 2 Selected Final Notice cases
Case
number
Organisation Year Fine Description of misconduct
1 JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. 2014 £222M Failed to control its London voice trading operations in the G10 spot and FX
market
2 JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. 2013 £196.5M Losses caused by high-risk trading strategy, weak management of that trading and
an inadequate appreciation of risk
3 UBS AG 2012 £160M Misconduct relating to the calculation of EURIBOR, manipulation of certain
currencies and inter-dealer collusion
4 Barclays Plc. 2012 £85M Inappropriate submissions following requests by derivative traders (LIBOR)
5 UBS AG 2012 £29.7M Rogue trading activity on exchange traded index future positions. Underlying
positions were disguised by the use of offsetting strategies, which had no
economic reality and no associated external risk position
6 Barclays Plc. 2014 £26M Failing to take reasonable care to organise and control its affairs responsibly and
effectively, with adequate Risk Management Systems (gold price fixing)
7 UBS AG 2009 £8M Unauthorised foreign exchange and precious metals trading
8 Toronto Dominion Bank
(London Branch)
2009 £7M Failing to conduct business with due care, skill and diligence—numerous and
serious failings in the Systems and controls concerning trading book pricing
9 Credit Suisse 2008 £5.6M Failing to conduct business with due skill, care and diligence. Failings relate to the
pricing of certain asset-backed securities
10 The Royal Bank of Scotland
Plc./N.V. (‘RBS’)
2013 £5.6M Failing to accurately report trading transaction as a result of significant Systems
challenges post-takeover
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other with expertise in safety research across a range of
high-risk industries. The framework used to analyse the
cases was derived from the five dimensions (and 25 sub-
dimensions) of safety culture extracted from the literature
review (see Table 1, Box 1). All ten FNs follow the FCA
standard template. Cases were assessed in terms of whether
they were consistent with the dimensions and sub-dimen-
sions of safety culture listed in Box 1. The parts of the
report that appeared to be associated with a dimension of
safety culture were coded within NVivo. Each FN was
analysed by a single coder (lead author), and five FNs were
additionally coded by an organisational psychologist (sec-
ond author) to ensure reliability.
Analysis
Prior to investigating the research questions, the reliability
of the qualitative content analysis was established. To do
this, the inter-rater reliability of the two raters (first and
second author) was examined using a Cohen’s kappa cal-
culation in NVivo11. Cohen’s kappa coefficient measures
inter-rater agreement for two raters for qualitative (cate-
gorical) items such as safety culture dimensions.2 Overall,
the reliability across the ten cases for the five safety culture
dimensions was good and across the dimensions ranged
from substantial agreement: Management Commitment to
Safety (k = 0.80), Rules and Regulations (k = 0.67),
Organisational Communication (k = 0.62) to moderate
agreement: Systems (k = 0.53) and fair agreement: Risk
Management (k = 0.26). Consistently low reliability was
shown across all sub-dimensions.
In order to investigate the role of safety culture in
financial trading, the following analyses were performed:
1. Establishing the role of safety culture in the Final
Notices
To examine whether safety culture theory can account
for employee risk practices in financial trading mishaps, we
investigated the extent to which the safety culture dimen-
sions listed in Box 1 were described in the FNs as under-
lying the problems leading to failures in Risk Management.
Each case was read and any textual references to the pre-
determined set of safety culture dimensions were identified
and classified in NVivo11.
2. Developing an initial framework of cultural dimen-
sions for measuring and evaluating safety culture in
financial trading
We further refined the safety culture framework in
Box 1 in order to provide an initial framework of cultural
dimensions for measuring and evaluating safety culture in
finance trading (Box 2). We did this through an examina-
tion of the most commonly occurring dimensions within
the cases (established in the first phase of analysis and
reporting), as well as exploring rarely used dimensions
across all the cases and creating a refined list of the rele-
vant dimensions in this domain. Simply, where safety
culture dimensions were identified within the FNs, these
were included within the framework. Where they were
absent, the dimensions were removed.
3. Examining how the dimensions of safety culture for
financial trading relate to risk practices reported in the
Final Notices
Finally, we examined the utility of the specific safety
culture dimensions for explaining risk practices in financial
trading. We did this through identifying parts of text in the
report previously coded as being associated with a
dimension of safety culture. We then analysed those seg-
ments of text in order to establish whether and how the
specific activities identified as problematic within the FNs
were influenced by the cultural dimension.
This required a more inductive approach (Braun and
Clarke 2006), whereby associations between the safety
culture dimensions and trading activities were identified.
Specifically, for the segments of text coded in NVivo as
referring to a safety culture dimension (in the first stage of
analysis), a single coder (lead author) identified the patterns
of trader activity that were reported and described. This
was an iterative process, whereby themes of associations
between the safety culture dimensions and trader activities
emerged (and were logged in NVivo). A second coder (the
second author) independently evaluated the generation of
themes, and these were then refined and interpreted through
further conceptualisation of how the safety culture
dimensions might be argued to influence activity. This was
done through reference to the broader literatures on safety
culture and financial trading. The inductive phase of
analysis helps to reveal themes or patterns specific to
financial trading that emerge from the cases, and this in
turn informs the creation of bespoke dimensions.
Results
The role of safety culture in financial trading
mishaps
The content analyses of the Final Notices were found to
yield rich data on how the organisational environment
shaped behaviours in the featured organisations. For
2 It is suggested that kappa results can be interpreted as value
k B 0.01–0.2 as none to slight, k B 0.21–0.40 as fair, k B 0.41–0.60
as moderate, k B 0.61–0.80 as substantial and k B 0.81–1.00 as
almost perfect (Fleiss and Cohen 1973; McHugh 2012).
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example, in eight of the cases, the perceived ability to
speak up (Organisational Communication) was critical to
embedding error and undermining mitigation opportunities
within the offending organisations. In the case of Barclays
Plc. (2012), the lack of ability to speak up was driven by
factors such as: unwanted negative press (p. 3); ‘internal
political pressure’ (p. 25); and a culture of secrecy ‘if you
breathe a word of this I’m not telling you anything else’ (p.
21). It appears that these unsafe practices influenced tra-
ders’ behaviour, leading to the continued submission of
inaccurate data and manipulation of internal performance
evaluation tools (e.g. profit and loss reports). To illustrate
the context of the data collected and the types of problems
codified across the safety culture dimensions and sub-di-
mensions, qualitative examples from the text are included
in Table 3.
Table 3 illustrates that 25% of the assessed cases relate
to the dimension of Organisational Communication and,
within this dimension, the most common coded sub-di-
mension is the ability to speak up (23%). The dimension
‘Systems Implementation’ was identified in 21% of the
assessed cases, with Systems alerts and detection (11%)
and incident reporting (10%) being the most common sub-
dimensions. The least frequently identified dimension was
Rules and Regulations (17%). In terms of sub-dimensions
of safety culture, the most common was rule dissemination
(16%) and safety training and drills (15%). The sub-di-
mension checklists (Rules and Regulations) was not iden-
tified in any of the cases. Similarly, certain sub-dimensions
were rarely coded such as: morale, blame and culpability
(Management Commitment to Safety), confidence in safety
(Risk Management), planning (Rules and Regulations) and
internal audit (Systems). Table 3 indicates that there are
rarely occurring sub-dimensions including confidence in
safety, planning and internal audit.
In order to refine the safety culture framework for future
use (e.g. to guide the development of a survey, root-cause
analysis of trading incidents), a number of further inter-
pretations were made, and we explore these in the fol-
lowing section.
A framework of cultural dimensions for measuring
and evaluating safety culture in financial trading
Below we describe and present a refined safety culture
framework, tailored to the financial trading domain. This
framework is based on the preceding analysis, and in par-
ticular, the results are reported in Table 3.
First, it is noticeable that the absence of sub-dimensions
(e.g. confidence in safety, planning and internal audit) may
indicate that these are less relevant in the assessment of
safety culture in the finance domain, and could be either
removed in future iterations of the framework or tested
through alternative methods (e.g. interviews).
Second, the content analysis of the sub-dimensions
reveals that some sub-dimensions exhibit low inter-rater
reliability. However, rather than removing the sub-dimen-
sions, it may be that those which touch on similar issues
could be combined in order to benefit the overall reliability.
For example, resources and system maintenance may be
combined, and safety training and rule dissemination might
also be combined.
Lastly, the FCA notices highlight the influence of
organisational incentives (e.g. bonuses) and opportunities
for advancement as drivers of safety behaviour (e.g. in the
LIBOR notices, the FCA indicates that it was common-
place for senior management to determine bonuses and
career advancement based on the size of an individual
trader’s book). Although the literature search that informed
the development of Box 1 does not explore power and
monetary rewards (e.g. bonuses), there is likely benefit in
studying the influence of rewards upon trading staff’s
safety behaviour. For example, research shows that, given
the nature of leaders in an organisational setting, and their
ability to dismiss or punish employees, it could be bene-
ficial to explore the value placed on money relative to that
of safety (Flin and Yule 2004; Zohar 2002). Therefore, we
believe that this sub-dimension warrants inclusion in the
safety culture framework and is most relevant to Man-
agement Commitment to Safety (Antonsen 2009).
Informed by the aforementioned findings and interpre-
tations, a synthesis is presented in Box 2, where we offer a
refined list of safety culture dimensions, tailored to the
context of financial trading.
Associations between safety culture dimensions
and risk practices in financial trading
We expand on Table 3 and Box 2, and consider (from a
safety culture perspective) the various manifestations and
poor employee risk activities that were captured in the
analysis of the FNs. The purpose is to test and opera-
tionalise how the constructs that comprise safety culture
theory impact behaviour within financial trading. Below we
report on associations between safety culture dimensions
and risk activities observed in the FNs, and also interpret
these within the wider safety culture and financial trading
literature. Crucially, the interpretative section allows us to
effectively map the safety culture dimensions onto the
observed behaviours in the FCA cases, and this promotes a
more nuanced understanding of the relationship between
safety culture and trading mishaps.
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Organisational Communication
Communication on risk (e.g. discussing threats to safety,
communicating procedures and changes and raising con-
cerns) was found to underpin an effective safety culture.
Across the FNs, organisations lacked a coherent commu-
nication plan for disseminating safety rules, procedures and
training. A lack of clear training and guidance regarding
internal policies of conduct was cited in nine of the ten
cases reviewed. For example, at Barclays Plc., the FCA
noted that ‘the firms lack of specific training and guidance,
given the absence of clear and sufficiently-tailored policies
and procedures…meant that personnel may have been
unaware of which conflicts of interest they should pay
particular attention to…’ and precipitated this particular
failure (Barclays Plc., p. 3).
The absence of training and communication on best
practices fostered confusion between the departments and a
lack of clarity regarding the utility of new policies or
collective regulatory responsibility. This meant that
oftentimes, the operational staff overlooked their regula-
tory responsibilities (e.g. price testing) or continued to
participate in the established risky practices (e.g. modify-
ing the submissions data when asked by Front Office).
In terms of the wider literature, previous research shows
good communication on organisational risks (e.g. as
established through training) is critical to developing a
strong safety culture (Olive et al. 2006), and it also appears
important for conceptualising and assessing safety culture
in financial trading (e.g. developing incident reporting
Systems, change, clear communication protocols).
Management Commitment to Safety
The FNs provide numerous examples of the importance of
Management Commitment to Safety in financial trading
organisations. Key drivers of employee risk practices
identified in the FNs were the behaviours and attitudes of
Box 2 Components of safety culture in finance
Organisational Communication: Policies with regard to effective collaboration and interaction of (groups) of people (e.g. policies determining
who should talk with whom about what)
Ability to speak up within the organisation
Transitions and teamwork across units
Trust in colleagues
Management Commitment to Safety: Policies with regard to supervision and motivation of the workforce and the adherence to the rules (e.g. what
is acceptable behaviour and how deviations should be corrected)
Blame and culpability
Employee participation (e.g. perceived empowerment)
Management safety attitude
Supervisor/management expectations
Safety motivation
Shared belief in the importance of safety
Risk Management: Policies with regard to which, when and how risks are evaluated (e.g. what the present dangers and risks are and how they
should be perceived and controlled)
Appreciations or risk (e.g. risk-taking behaviour)
Confidence in safety (e.g. control measures, safety standards)
Conflict between work and safety (e.g. risk appetite and performance goals)
Rules and Regulations: Policies with regard to formal procedures and instructions (balanced by what is trained and how workers are recruited and
selected). Basically, policies determining the structure of work
Rule dissemination
Safety training and drills
System Implementation: Policies with regard to how identified risks are avoided, reduced or controlled by design or layout (e.g. policies
determining the choice of barriers that control present dangers and risks) and policies with regard to maintenance and inspection (e.g. when
(preventative vs corrective) and how often, etc.)
Incident reporting (non-punitive)
Organisation of system access rights (e.g. access to information based on roles)
Resources
Systems alerts and controls
Systems maintenance (e.g. breach reports sent consistently)
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Table 3 Safety culture dimensions and sub-dimensions identified in the FCA cases
Dimensions Sub-
dimensions
Description Example Coding
frequency
Organisational
Communication
124
(55%)
Ability to
speak up
Refers to extent to which employees are
comfortable or perceived to be able (e.g.
organisational constraints) to voice
concerns inter-/intra-team
‘Lack of product knowledge within the
collateral team which meant that no
effective challenge was made’
52 (23%)
Transitions
across teams
Refers to the coordination of processes and
tasks within and between interdisciplinary
teams
‘Work streams operated in silos; those
preforming the work lacked awareness of
the overall context’
26 (11%)
Trust in
colleagues
The measure of confidence and competence
in team members
‘These traders formed close, tightknit groups
or one-to-one relationships based upon
mutual benefit’
25 (11%)
Total 227
(25%)
Management
Commitment to
Safety
105
(62%)
Blame and
culpability
A measure of the culture of blame shifting or
lack of acceptance of organisational
responsibilities
‘Are we guilty of being part of the pack? You
could say we are’
6 (4%)
Employee
participation
The extent to which employees perceive they
are able to contribute to decisions and
organisational process
‘Front office was able to input, change and
approve FX trades with no effective
challenge from the Back Office’
15 (9%)
Management
safety
attitude
Management perceived prioritisation of
safety and productivity
‘Senior management at high levels within
Barclays expressed concerns over this
negative publicity’
12 (7%)
Manager
expectations
The perceived expectations of management
to perform safely
‘Senior management concerns in turn
resulted in instructions being given by less
senior managers at Barclays to reduce
LIBOR submissions in order to avoid
negative media comment’
10 (6%)
Morale The confidence, enthusiasm and discipline of
the team at a specific time
‘The external trader thanks Trader G for
Barclay’s LIBOR submissions later that
day; ‘‘Dude. I owe you big time! Come over
one day after work and I’m opening a bottle
of Bollinger’’’
1 (0.5%)
Safety
motivation
The reasons for demonstrating good or poor
safety behaviour
‘The authority was deliberately misled on one
occasion’
12 (7%)
Shared belief
in the
importance
of safety
The beliefs and values in regard to safety that
originate from manager-directed joint
learning
‘Although action plans were in place to
improve processes for future months, no
additional scrutiny of the March month-end
valuation process was undertaken by CIO
Finance or CIO VCG management’
9 (5%)
Total 170
(19%)
Risk
Management
96 (56%)
Appreciations
of risk
The perceived likelihood and action or
inaction taken as a result of gaining or
losing asset value
‘Barclays did not believe the submission of
LIBOR was an area of significant risk’
31 (18%)
Confidence in
safety
The state of being certain with the
management’s course of action in regard to
safety process and procedure
‘Business model placed significant reliance
on the honesty of employees and the
supervisory obligations of Desk Heads
without taking steps to mitigate against the
risk that employees would act
incompetently or dishonestly’
5 (3%)
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Table 3 continued
Dimensions Sub-
dimensions
Description Example Coding
frequency
Conflict
between
work and
safety
Impacts the decision to meet performance
requirements (productivity) or to adhere to
the standard operating procedure (safety)
‘At the direction of the SCP management,
they deliberately mismarked the SCP in
order to conceal what one trader believed to
be genuine losses’
38 (22%)
Total 170
(19%)
Rules and
Regulations
91 (60%)
Planning The existence of procedures to evaluate risks
and establish the necessary safety measures
for avoiding accidents
‘Reassignments and reorganisations within
certain control functions, together with
remote supervision and demanding
workloads, exacerbated the situation’
1 (0.7%)
Rule
dissemination
The availability (e.g. access) and distribution
of information in regard to safety rules
within and across the organisation
‘Compliance replied with appropriate advice
by email, there is no record of wider
dissemination of the guidance or of steps to
ensure this was reflected in (JPMorgan’s)
policies or controls’
25 (16%)
Safety rules Refers to the existence of protocols and
procedures for operating safely during
routine and non-routine tasks
‘Compliance reviews lacked depth and a
robust risk assessment process. The
monitoring (of international wealth
business) had limited impact on identifying
and improving the control framework’
13 (9%)
Safety training
and drills
The existence of training programs or
opportunities to simulate situations where
employees face routine and non-routine
tasks
‘The firm’s lack of specific training and
guidance, given the absence of clear and
sufficiently-tailored policies and procedures
… meant that personnel may have been
unaware’
22 (15%)
Total 152
(17%)
Systems
implementation
100
(53%)
Incident
reporting
A method of recording details of non-routine
events that occur within the organisation
that can undermine organisational safety
and performance (e.g. human error,
Systems error)
‘It failed appropriately to escalate issues that
may have led to earlier detection of the
pricing issues’
19 (10%)
Internal audit The provisions of independent assurance that
Risk Management, governance and internal
control processes are operating effectively
‘Internal audit failed appropriately to follow
up, finalise and report the finding that GMO
were accepting market quotes from the
front office as independent’
7 (4%)
Organisation of
system rights
Segregation of access to system information
and modifications based on job
responsibilities
‘There was confusion within GMO as to the
segregation of duties and responsibilities in
conducting the IPV process’
14 (8%)
Resources The efficient apportioning of time, capital
and personnel
‘CIO VCG needed to manually copy this data
into its own price testing spreadsheet row
by row. This resulted in data entry errors’
10 (5%)
System alerts
and
detections
The capability of the system to accurately
monitor and detect system abuse
‘There was no automatic filter in the trade
input Systems which identified off market
or large notional transactions and the
amendment of a price’
21 (11%)
System
maintenance
The timely maintenance and modification of
system controls and capabilities
‘(Barclays) made no changes to its Systems
and controls to take account of the BBA’
16 (9%)
Total 187
(21%)
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senior management for prioritising safe operations. For
example, at the direction of the management at JPMorgan
Chase Bank N.A., traders falsely priced their positions in
order to minimise published losses and benefit the bid-ask
spread in the organisation’s favour. Going further, when
management at JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A. discovered the
large, relatively illiquid positions, they did not immediately
request a reduction in the positions and instead allowed the
traders to take increasingly larger positions.
In all ten cases we analysed, the FCA cites insufficient
scrutiny by the management tasked with overseeing trading
strategy as a key factor in the occurrence of trading mis-
haps. A consistent pattern emerges of a lack of actual or
perceived management prioritisation for safety in the cases
(as enacted through behaviour, statements, Systems and
procedures) shaping normative expectations on trader
performance, and influencing trader risk-taking activities
through this mechanism. This perhaps emphasises the
importance of Management Commitment to Safety for
creating the atmosphere and tone (e.g. attitudes towards
issues around risk, error, blame) for the acceptability and
unacceptability of risky and unethical practices.
In terms of the literature on safety culture, the influence
of management prioritising production goals over safety
upon risk-related activities is observed in many domains
and is associated with safety activities (Zohar 2010). It has
also been identified as crucial in incident investigations.
For example, mishaps such as the Deep-water Horizon
(DH) oil spill are somewhat analogous to the FNs (Reader
and O’Connor 2014). In the case of the DH blowout, the
National Commission (2011) reported that many of the
riskier operational decisions were made due to a desire to
save time, costs and ensure long-term viability of the well
‘without full appreciation of the associated risks’ (National
Oil Spill Commission 2011, p. 223).
Risk Management
Key to an effective safety culture is a description, per-
ception and acceptance of what the present dangers and
risks to the organisation are (e.g. conflicts between per-
formance and safety). A recurrent problem identified
within the FNs was the failure of organisations to recognise
and address incidents. For example, in the Toronto
Dominion case, the FCA finds that the organisation ‘failed
to appropriately escalate issues that may have led to earlier
detection of the pricing issues’ (Toronto Dominion, p. 2).
Similar key findings are listed in eight of the ten cases
reviewed. Through not sharing, collecting or emphasising
information on previous incidents and near misses, the
likelihood of a future failure is increased. Furthermore, in
the cases studied, the lack of a clear policy on reporting
incidents or a dedicated feedback system discouraged
front-line staff from reporting incident information, which
negatively shaped risk escalation behaviours.
In relation to the safety culture and financial trading
literature, this is consistent with research showing that poor
internal management processes, general Systems, or a lack
of willingness or ability of staff to escalate incidents can
seriously hinder the collection of relevant risk data and
undermine the development of robust Risk Management
models (Bryce et al. 2013). In other industries, the imple-
mentation of a confidential incident and near-miss report-
ing system provides a means for the organisation to collect,
identify and ameliorate risks within the system, and to
provide a proactive measure of Risk Management that
encourages employee participation, raises awareness, pro-
motes adaptation and engenders social responsibility for
safety (Jeffcott et al. 2006). Similar Systems are being
developed in financial trading and would appear useful for
developing the safety culture of trading organisations
(Leaver and Reader 2016).
Rules and Regulations
The FNs illustrate numerous issues relating to Rules and
Regulations, with issues around training and skills being
particularly prominent. For example, an over-reliance on
the technical knowledge of the traders exacerbated the
failures described in the FNs. In the Credit Suisse case, the
FCA points out that ‘Undue reliance was placed in the
technical ability and revenue contribution of certain Front
Office staff, who were highly influential in down-playing
price testing and variances’ (Credit Suisse, p4). Front
Office staff (e.g. traders) regularly circumvented the con-
trols in place by exploiting their technical ability and
expertise relative to the control teams, which centralised
the decision-making on the floor. Lack of training or
knowledge in the support teams shaped the practices of the
risk control team (e.g. inability to challenge the Front
Office strategies and the acceptance of inaccurate pricing
data) and led to a situation where the trading support team
tasked with challenging the Front office operated at a
diminished capacity.
In the most obvious case of exploitation, the FCA notes
that ‘Within UBS the Operations Division (trading support)
acted as a facilitation division rather than having a specific
risk control mandate…There was a culture of helping the
traders to clear breaks on the basis of the explanations they
provided as opposed to challenging the traders and ques-
tioning whether their explanations were correct’ (UBS AG,
p4). In this case, problems arose as a result of the organi-
sations approach to the first line of defence in Risk Man-
agement, which assumed skills those involved did not have
(e.g. the ability to challenge the Front Office).
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The safety culture literature has indicated the impor-
tance of Rules and Regulations for influencing behaviour
(Hopkins 2011; Lawton 1998; Reason et al. 1998), for
example in terms of ensuring procedures reflect the work
that is done within an organisation and ensuring safety
procedures are followed. Rules and Regulations provide
frameworks and protocols for controlling risk and are
useful because they specify the expected minimum beha-
vioural standards of employees. This appears also to have
been the case in the FNs, indicating the importance of
Rules and Regulations as a dimension of safety culture in
financial trading.
Systems Implementation
Across the ten FCA cases, the Systems used to oversee and
monitor the trading activity were identified as complex and
fragmented. Within safety culture theory, Systems Imple-
mentation (e.g. policies, monitoring Systems) is crucial for
ensuring organisations are able to identify risks and pro-
vide appropriate resources for effectively managing and
ameliorating risk. The FNs revealed systematic problems in
System Implementation, with ‘overly complex and frag-
mented’ reporting Systems undermining the ability of
employees to detect and manage warning signals. For
example, in the UBS AG case, the FCA noted that ‘The
Systems and controls in place, such as a complex matrix
structure for the supervision of traders in the SCG, were too
complicated and fragmented. Some individuals within the
control functions lacked a clear understanding of the
responsibilities that had been assigned to them’ (UBS AG,
p. 4).
Similarly, in the RBS case, the FCA found that ‘overly
complex and fragmented recording and reporting Systems
required significant work to ensure they were effective …
(the Company) failed to appreciate the full scale of the
reporting problems across the business’ (RBS, p. 3).
This is consistent with the financial trading literature,
where it is argued that without an effective and transparent
risk escalation process (e.g. ensuring front-line personnel
are willing to report problems), risk managers will struggle
to measure, assess, control or manage the risks within the
organisation (Bryce et al. 2013; Wahlstrom 2006). In
relation to the FNs, it appeared that the lines of supervision
were blurred by complex and fragmented supervision and
the coordination and communication of information was
disrupted within and across the teams. This reduced the
ability of the operational staff to gather and interpret rel-
evant safety information and make appropriate safety
decisions. Future research is required to examine the
impacts of this fragmentation, with System Implementation
being important for ensuring clear lines of reporting and
access to relevant information for decision-making.
Emergent Theme of Organisational Incentives
In addition to the synergies between the safety culture lit-
erature and the Final Notices, it is notable that, across all of
the cases, organisational incentives were identified as a
cause of employee risky and unethical behaviours.
For example, investigation of the Final Notices reveals
several instances where conflicts of interest between work
(e.g. profit generation) and safety (e.g. regulatory adher-
ence) exacerbated the trading mishaps. This is a classic
indicator of safety culture (Flin et al. 2000) and illustrates
how the failure of active trading strategies can lead to
fiscally disastrous consequences. Many of the riskier trad-
ing strategies (e.g. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A.) were
allowed to continue in a desire to post stronger gains and
avoid financial penalties, and decisions were made without
a full appreciation of the risks involved. The profit-making
interests of the management conflicted with the realities of
the market and led to situations where traders were forced
to decide between one outcome (follow management
directive) and another (publish in line with the market). In
the case of UBS AG, these ‘mixed messages’ had disas-
trous consequences, as increased media scrutiny regarding
its submissions process and speculations about its credit
worthiness led to the dissemination of informal directives
by group management to ‘protect our franchise in these
sensitive markets’ (UBS AG, p. 4). In turn, traders and
submission staff continued to collude with other market
players in order to stem the publishing of daily losses. The
conflict of interest between organisational interests (e.g.
making profit) and client or wider market interests (e.g. in
the fair valuation of the underlying assets) are cited by the
FCA as key findings in all ten of the cases reviewed.
In terms of the safety culture literature, incentives are
generally not included as a dimension of safety culture.
This is perhaps because, in many high-risk domains,
financial incentives are not used to the same extent as a
reward (or otherwise) for performance. Yet, they appear
crucial for the trading domain (and in particular, for
shaping trader activity), and merit being considered as a
distinct dimension.
Discussion
In this study, we examined the role of safety culture in ten
high-profile organisational failures in the UK financial
trading industry.
First, we found that dimensions of safety culture were
routinely identified as underlying failures in financial trading
organisations, for example in terms of how management
attitudes regarding negative performance influenced traders
to submit false prices in order to achieve productivity goals.
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Second, based on the absence and presence of safety
culture dimensions identified within the FNs, an initial
framework of cultural dimensions for measuring and
evaluating safety culture in financial trading was
developed.
Third, through examining how the specific dimensions
of safety culture related to risk practices reported in the
Final Notices, their utility for explaining risky and uneth-
ical behaviour in financial trading was examined, for
example in terms of how Management Commitment to
Safety influenced trader pricing positions, Risk Manage-
ment influenced risk escalation and System Implementa-
tion compromised the ability of management to detect
warning signals.
Theoretical Implications
In financial trading, risky and unethical employee practices
do not necessarily lead to loss of life, but can have a huge
impact upon economic and social structures. The current
analysis indicates the relevance of safety culture for under-
standing mishaps within the financial industry. Financial
trading was conceptualised in terms of high-reliability
industries, whereby risky and unethical behaviours are
understood as a product of organisational environments, with
poor practices reflecting management priorities, inadequate
safety Systems and a lack of training and communication.
Yet, it is notable that financial trading also differs sub-
stantially from most high-risk domains where safety cul-
ture is applied. Commonly, in such domains, risk is
something to be mitigated or removed from a system.
However, in financial trading, risk-taking is key to profit
and competitive advantage and this changes how safety
culture is conceptualised within financial trading (e.g. in
comparison with aviation). Consistent with ‘risk culture’
research (Ashby et al. 2012), safety culture in financial
trading refers more to the extent to which employees are
implicitly or explicitly encouraged to take risks where
long-term costs are significant, but are outweighed by
short-term gains for the organisation and employees. For
example, the FNs illustrate how various organisational
issues (fragmented Systems and controls) and behavioural
practices (ability to escalate an incident), regulation (in-
consistent distribution of information regarding safety
rules) and incentives (the prioritisation of profit over
market compliancy) lead to poor employee risk practices.
It is noticeable that there are also broad similarities
between the dimensions of safety culture identified in
Box 2 and the Institute of Risk Management’s (IRM) ‘Risk
Culture Aspects Model’. For example, selected themes
identified in IRM’s model such as ‘tone at the top’ and
‘governance’ map well onto the behaviours indicated in
Box 2 under ‘Management Commitment to Safety’ and
‘Rules and Regulations’ (Institute of Risk Management
2012). These similarities provide further evidence of the
applicability of a safety culture framework in this domain,
indicating that the application of a safety culture frame-
work is not only fitting, but that it can enrich the existing
models though a deeper understanding of the specific
behaviours that underlie the incidents. Drawing on previ-
ous safety culture research (Antonsen 2012) it is also
indicative of the interventional steps that might be taken to
improve safety culture in these settings (such as team
training, incident reporting and monitoring and organisa-
tional learning exercises).
Future investigations might focus on refining the
dimensions identified as underpinning safety culture in
financial trading. For example, our analysis of Manage-
ment Commitment to Safety and incentive structures
reveals that employee’s perception of management priori-
tisation (and how they are rewarded) influences risky and
unethical behaviours. This might be useful to explore fur-
ther. For example, by focusing on the priority workers
place (and lengths they will go to) on securing financial
rewards and avoiding penalties, we can better understand
how pressure from a superior can lead to unsafe behaviour.
Crucially, the predictive validity of safety culture theory
for predicting or reducing mishaps in financial trading is
required to demonstrate its ultimate utility. This can be
achieved through the development of rigorous and psy-
chometrically robust tools for measuring safety culture in
financial trading.
Practical Implications
Although this industry is not a tabula rasa in terms of tools
to analyse risk culture (e.g. surveys, structured question-
naires and scorecards), we aimed to empirically inform
current approaches through adopting a safety culture per-
spective (Institute of Risk Management 2012).
The framework presented in Box 2 is a first step in
achieving this and can inform the development of culture
measurement tools in financial trading. The form of these
tools may be diverse (see Guldenmund 2000, for a review);
however, the most common procedure for collecting safety
culture data is the use of employee cross-sectional surveys.
Through a series of questions, surveys typically measure
staff at all levels of an organisation on their beliefs, values,
attitudes and perceptions towards risk. Data are associated
with organisational outcome data and triangulated against
other culture indicators data (e.g. incident reports, customer
evaluations).
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Box 2 outlines the potential dimensions of a safety
culture survey, and a safety culture assessment would
examine the strengths, weaknesses and conflicts (e.g.
between management and employees) on each cultural
dimension. This typically leads to remedial action: for
example training, modification of key processes, commu-
nication from management (Mearns et al. 2013). Such data
also allow for benchmarking and inter-organisational
learning, which is routine practice within aviation, energy
and nuclear power (Carroll 1998; Mearns et al. 2001; Noort
et al. 2015). As our current research is limited by the use of
only one data source, we propose the development and
testing of a survey tool with the participation of employees
in different financial institutions internationally. This
would be of considerable use for financial trading organi-
sations (e.g. for learning about their culture, addressing
problems) and regulators (e.g. to identify best practice, and
problematic organisations). In addition, research might
examine whether the safety culture model needs further
adaptation to reflect the different nature of organisations
working in the financial sector (e.g. asset-driven organi-
sations versus speculative trading houses).
Alternative approaches to examining safety culture may
not focus on perceptions of risk practices, but instead
gather behavioural data, for example, through systemati-
cally collecting and analysing data on trading incidents.
Such incidents can contain valuable data for avoiding
future mishaps (on poor working practices, IT Systems)
and for monitoring risk. Where incidents are reported
voluntarily by staff, this can be highly symbolic of the
culture (as it indicates a ‘just’ and ‘mature’ culture), whilst
also revealing issues within the culture (e.g. on the pres-
sures being experienced by staff). These approaches (sur-
veys, incident reporting Systems) are mainstay approaches
to monitoring risky and unethical practices in other high-
risk domains and would appear equally useful for financial
trading.
Limitations
This study has the following limitations. First, the literature
review for identifying safety culture studies was not com-
prehensive, and it may have failed to capture other
dimensions of safety culture important for financial trading.
Second, the use of FCA FNs is only one method of col-
lecting data on safety culture in the finance domain and the
data have not been triangulated with other forms of data.
This may lead to methodological bias, such as common
method bias, with assumptions being based on one form of
data and analysis (Podsakoff et al. 2003). Furthermore, the
use of FNs as the data source also produces a limitation as
they are considered secondary sources and their accuracy is
difficult to confirm. Third, there are limitations in inter-
rater coding. As the level of discrimination is quite high in
the analysis of textual data with several dimensions, reli-
ability is more difficult to assess and careful training of the
coders is crucial. Also, judgements about the level of kappa
that is deemed acceptable in the literature vary and should
be considered in the interpretation of the results. Lastly,
there are other existing culture-based theoretical lenses
beyond safety culture that could be adopted to analyse
these cases such as a competing values framework. For
example, the competing values framework is a widely used
cultural framework for profiling the culture of organisa-
tions (for a full review, see Cameron and Quinn 2005).
Conclusions
Culture measurement and change has previously been
identified as crucial for restoring trust, improving Risk
Management and avoiding future failures in financial
institutions (House of Commons Treasury Committee
2009; Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards
2013). Yet, a clear conceptualisation of what the desired
culture for the industry is, and how it might be measured, is
currently lacking (Power et al. 2013; Ring et al. 2016). To
address these challenges, we examined whether, akin to
other high-risk industries, safety culture theory provides a
useful conceptual framework for understanding failures to
manage risk in financial trading.
Through applying safety culture theory to analyse ten
trading mishaps published in the FCA Final Notices, the
study found that dimensions of safety culture were rou-
tinely identified as underlying failures in financial trading
organisations. This counters narratives focusing on traders
as unethical ‘rule breakers’ and instead emphasises the
influence of social environments upon behaviour in finan-
cial institutions. To investigate this, the study developed an
initial framework of cultural dimensions for measuring and
evaluating safety culture in financial trading and examined
how these dimensions were associated with the specific
risk-related activities reported in the Final Notices. The
results indicate that safety culture is a useful conceptual
framework through which to understand and predict risky
and unethical behaviour in financial trading, and can also
inform the development of tools for assessing and invoking
culture change.
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